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Abstract:	  The	  distinction	  between	  ‘power	  to’	  and	  ‘power	  over’,	  and	  the	  conceptualisation	  of	  their	  relationship,	  is	  highly	  relevant	  to	  an	  understanding	  of	  social	  evolution.	  	  They	  are	  in	  fact	  causally	  and	  historically	  interdependent.	  	  I	  claim	  that	  major	  social	  transformations	  such	  as	  the	  neolithic	  and	  industrial	  ‘revolutions’	  need	  to	  be	  understood	  in	  this	  light,	  as	  does	  the	  heightening	  of	  formalised	  competition	  in	  contemporary	  liberal	  society.	  	  I	  consider	  the	  current	  literature	  on	  social	  evolution	  critically,	  and	  make	  a	  case	  for	  applying	  some	  of	  its	  ideas	  to	  the	  long-­‐term	  general	  history	  of	  human	  society.	  	  The	  entire	  argument	  is	  framed	  within	  a	  concern	  to	  develop	  a	  more	  pragmatic	  understanding	  of	  power,	  aware	  of	  problems	  arising	  from	  an	  Enlightenment-­‐derived	  distrust	  of	  ‘power	  over’.	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As	  people	  band	  together,	  and	  co-­‐operate	  to	  achieve	  their	  goals,	  each	  comes	  
to	  have	  more	  control	  over	  his	  own	  life:	  his	  power	  is	  increased	  with	  the	  help	  
of	  others.	  	  But,	  simultaneously,	  other	  people	  start	  having	  some	  control	  over	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him.	  	  This	  process	  can	  lead	  to	  the	  alternative	  horror	  with	  which	  to	  contrast	  
an	  ideal,	  autonomous	  life:	  that	  in	  which	  one	  is	  enslaved—Peter	  Morriss	  (2002:	  40)	  




Our	  way	  of	  talking	  and	  thinking	  about	  power	  is	  inherited	  from	  the	  age	  of	  Enlightenment	  and	  revolutions.	  	  In	  that	  dawn	  of	  modern	  nations,	  deep	  patterns	  were	  laid	  down,	  in	  which	  the	  power	  of	  some	  people	  over	  others,	  traditionally	  embodied	  in	  aristocratic	  hierarchies,	  was	  challenged	  and	  rejected	  by	  reconfigured	  ‘peoples’.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time	  aspirations	  to	  a	  world	  in	  which	  our	  natural	  individual	  powers	  were	  unshackled	  and	  fully	  realised,	  a	  world	  of	  ‘natural	  liberty’,	  was	  articulated,	  informing	  a	  range	  of	  ideologies	  that	  would	  follow,	  from	  liberalism	  to	  Marxism.	  	  But	  that	  is	  not	  the	  world	  that	  age	  has	  delivered	  us	  into.	  	  Instead	  traditional	  hierarchies	  were	  replaced	  by	  new	  ones,	  based	  on	  success	  in	  a	  new	  range	  of	  bureaucracies	  and	  stratified	  networks.	  	  The	  hard	  lesson	  here	  is	  that	  social	  hierarchy	  of	  some	  form	  is	  a	  fixture	  of	  complex,	  large-­‐scale	  society:	  we	  may	  choose	  how	  we	  do	  it,	  but	  not	  whether	  we	  do	  it.	  	  Our	  theories	  and	  language	  of	  power	  has	  had	  trouble	  accepting	  this	  state	  of	  affairs,	  and	  continues	  to	  want	  to	  neatly	  separate	  ‘power	  over’	  as	  a	  social	  problem,	  from	  ‘power	  to’	  as	  a	  positive	  natural	  endowment.	  	  We	  are	  much	  more	  comfortable	  critiquing	  power	  than	  we	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are	  matter-­‐of-­‐factly	  describing	  it.i	  	  This	  article	  does	  not	  reject	  this	  analytic	  distinction,	  but	  argues	  that	  ultimately	  we	  must	  understand	  power	  as	  hierarchy,	  and	  power	  as	  capability,	  as	  causally	  interdependent	  aspects	  of	  the	  same	  social	  and	  historical	  process.	  	  Power	  in	  human	  society	  evolves,	  and	  we	  need	  to	  understand	  how	  it	  evolves	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  its	  nature.	  	  I	  proceed	  by	  first	  discussing	  the	  to/over	  distinction	  in	  the	  study	  of	  power,	  then	  by	  addressing	  current	  theories	  of	  social	  evolution,	  and	  finally	  by	  bringing	  these	  together	  in	  a	  broad	  sketch	  of	  the	  social	  evolution	  of	  power	  to/over	  in	  human	  history,	  and	  its	  current	  form	  in	  liberal	  societies.	  
Power	  To/Over	  
We	  can	  identify	  analytic,	  normative,	  and	  processual	  issues	  in	  the	  decision	  to	  draw	  a	  distinction	  between	  power-­‐to	  and	  power-­‐overii.	  	  Analytically	  it	  allows	  us	  to	  distinguish	  between	  the	  sheer	  capacity	  of	  agents	  to	  achieve	  ends,	  and	  the	  social	  relationships	  in	  which	  some	  agents	  can	  determine	  the	  actions	  of	  others.	  	  For	  some	  purposes	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  demarcate	  these	  meanings	  of	  power.	  	  If	  we	  are	  particularly	  interested	  in	  how,	  and	  under	  what	  circumstances,	  some	  gain	  power	  over	  others,	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  implicitly	  involves	  some	  sort	  of	  power-­‐to	  can	  be	  held	  as	  constant	  and	  taken	  for	  granted.	  	  The	  debates	  about	  power’s	  definition	  that	  run	  from	  Dahl	  (1957)	  up	  to	  Lukes	  (1974),	  with	  their	  various	  assertions	  about	  ‘A’s	  imposing	  their	  wills	  on	  ‘B’s,	  all	  took	  this	  as	  a	  basic	  assumption.	  	  They	  were	  largely	  concerned	  about	  power	  relations	  between	  individuals,	  groups,	  and	  classes.	  	  	  On	  the	  other	  side,	  those	  such	  as	  Parsons	  (2002[1963])	  and	  Arendt	  (1969)	  who	  stressed	  the	  power-­‐to	  concept	  were	  more	  concerned	  with	  the	  legitimation	  of	  the	  aggregate,	  systemic	  power	  of	  the	  modern	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democratic	  state.	  	  What	  I	  want	  to	  highlight	  here	  is	  the	  generally	  synchronic	  nature	  and	  functionalism	  of	  these	  analyses,	  concerned	  with	  how	  to	  define	  power-­‐over	  or	  power-­‐to	  in	  principle,	  in	  the	  abstract,	  in	  ways	  that	  can	  generally	  be	  applied	  to	  all	  cases.	  	  As	  they	  serve	  different	  analytic	  purposes,	  there	  was	  a	  tendency	  to	  develop	  these	  two	  conceptions	  of	  power	  as	  alternatives,	  and	  sometimes	  as	  rival	  conceptions.	  	  But	  this	  is	  only	  tenable	  in	  this	  decomposed	  and	  timeless	  analytic	  frame.	  
We	  also	  make	  this	  distinction	  for	  normative	  reasons.	  	  As	  Morriss	  (2002:	  36-­‐46)	  has	  argued,	  we	  need	  a	  concept	  of	  power-­‐to	  in	  order	  to	  assign	  responsibility	  for	  actions:	  one	  can’t	  be	  blamed	  if	  one	  didn’t	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  do	  it,	  or	  not	  do	  it.	  	  And	  we	  also	  evaluate	  larger	  systems	  and	  distributions	  of	  power,	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  they	  both	  achieve	  power-­‐to	  for	  their	  members,	  and	  manage	  power-­‐over	  among	  them.	  	  More	  generally,	  as	  I’ve	  already	  suggested,	  we	  tend,	  as	  creatures	  of	  modern	  liberal	  societies	  to	  normatively	  resist	  the	  idea	  of	  power-­‐over,	  or	  require	  its	  special	  justification	  (e.g.,	  as	  necessary	  for	  child	  rearing).	  	  Power-­‐over	  as	  such	  is	  permanently	  suspect	  and	  in	  need	  of	  qualification	  and	  legitimation.	  	  Power-­‐to	  is	  aligned	  with	  ideas	  of	  ‘empowerment’,	  and	  enjoys	  an	  automatic	  positive	  glow	  (even	  though	  one	  can	  be	  empowered	  to	  do	  harm!).	  	  	  Thus	  democratic	  theory	  as	  a	  whole,	  in	  addition	  to	  offering	  practical	  suggestions	  for	  the	  management	  of	  power,	  tends	  to	  take	  the	  form	  of	  a	  normative	  argument	  supporting	  a	  certain	  degree	  and	  arrangement	  of	  trade-­‐off,	  of	  accepting	  power-­‐over	  in	  exchange	  for	  enhancing	  power-­‐to.	  	  This	  makes	  good	  sense,	  but	  once	  again	  it	  also	  tends	  to	  get	  done	  in	  a	  rather	  abstracted	  theoretical	  space	  in	  which	  democracy	  is	  modeled	  and	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evaluated	  (e.g.	  Held	  1987;	  Pettit	  1997).	  	  It	  usually	  leaves	  aside	  the	  thornier	  historical	  problems	  of	  why	  power-­‐to	  and	  power-­‐over	  evolve	  together.	  
So,	  we	  also	  need	  to	  make	  this	  distinction	  for	  reasons	  of	  processual	  analysis.	  	  To	  understand	  how	  power	  relations	  change	  and	  develop	  over	  time,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  be	  able	  both	  to	  distinguish	  power	  as	  capacity	  versus	  as	  hierarchy,	  and	  also	  to	  be	  able	  to	  argue	  why	  and	  how	  these	  aspects	  interact	  in	  a	  dynamic	  way.	  	  The	  notion	  of	  a	  trade-­‐off	  between	  the	  two,	  just	  introduced	  in	  regard	  to	  democratic	  theory,	  turns	  out	  not	  to	  be	  specific	  to	  democracy,	  but	  more	  general	  for	  the	  history	  of	  human	  society.	  	  It	  is	  just	  that	  with	  the	  democratic	  era	  the	  idea,	  or	  problem,	  comes	  out	  into	  the	  open,	  in	  plainer	  view	  as	  it	  were.	  	  My	  general	  definition	  of	  social	  power	  would	  be:	  the	  capacity	  of	  agents,	  broadly	  defined,	  to	  achieve	  intended	  and	  foreseen	  effects.	  	  These	  effects	  can	  be	  on	  other	  agents,	  or	  the	  world	  more	  generally	  (Hearn	  2012:	  16;	  indebted	  to	  Wrong	  2002:	  21).	  	  I	  am	  in	  agreement	  with	  Morriss	  (2002)	  that	  we	  best	  understand	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  word	  and	  concept	  ‘power’	  (as	  with	  all	  language)	  when	  we	  inquire	  about	  its	  utility—how	  is	  it	  used.	  	  We	  normally	  use	  the	  word	  power	  to	  identify	  the	  capacity	  for	  action	  of	  things	  (cars)	  and	  persons	  (agents)	  with	  a	  concern	  for	  understanding	  wider	  causal	  effects	  and	  potentialities.	  	  The	  -­‐to	  and	  -­‐over	  dimensions	  are	  built	  into	  the	  very	  purposes	  of	  the	  concept.	  	  Because	  it	  in	  some	  ways	  encapsulates	  the	  whole	  argument	  let	  me	  connect	  this	  point	  about	  the	  meaning	  of	  power	  to	  the	  role	  of	  language	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  Humans,	  as	  a	  species	  of	  life,	  developed	  the	  capacity	  for	  language	  because	  it	  gave	  them	  the	  ability	  to	  more	  precisely	  know	  and	  control	  their	  environment.	  	  The	  ability	  to	  abstract	  from	  and	  map	  reality	  through	  language	  brings	  with	  it	  a	  greater	  capacity	  to	  analyse,	  calculate	  and	  predict.	  	  And	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this	  in	  turn	  has	  bestowed	  on	  humans	  greater	  control	  over	  an	  array	  of	  environments.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  language	  also	  enables	  much	  wider	  and	  more	  subtle	  communication	  between	  members	  of	  the	  group,	  allowing	  them	  to	  coordinate	  their	  actions	  in	  much	  more	  complex	  ways.	  	  This	  too	  enhances	  the	  power	  of	  the	  group	  and	  its	  members.	  	  In	  short,	  language	  gave	  humans	  an	  adaptive	  advantage.	  	  This	  has	  been	  central	  to	  the	  expansion	  of	  human	  domain	  over	  other	  living	  creatures	  and	  the	  planet.	  	  The	  evolution	  of	  language	  itself	  is	  a	  primary	  case	  in	  point	  of	  the	  interdependence	  of	  power-­‐to	  and	  power-­‐over.	  	  	  
Social	  Evolution	  
As	  the	  foregoing	  suggests,	  I	  contend	  that	  an	  important	  context	  for	  developing	  our	  thinking	  about	  power	  to/over	  as	  history,	  as	  process,	  is	  that	  of	  social	  evolutionary	  theory.	  	  My	  position	  is	  midway	  between	  standard	  views	  in	  comparative	  historical	  sociology,	  which	  I	  think	  can	  afford	  to	  draw	  more	  on	  evolutionary	  concepts,	  and	  current	  theories	  of	  social	  evolution,	  which	  I	  think	  need	  to	  work	  harder	  to	  speak	  to	  the	  comparative	  historical	  tradition,	  and	  tend	  to	  over-­‐extend	  analogies	  to	  evolution	  in	  the	  biological	  sphere.	  	  What	  I	  have	  to	  say	  is	  unlikely	  to	  satisfy	  either	  side,	  but	  perhaps	  can	  provoke	  dialogue.	  
As	  a	  baseline,	  before	  examining	  the	  literature,	  I	  offer	  my	  own	  minimal	  definition.	  	  By	  ‘social	  evolution’	  I	  mean	  change	  due	  to	  selection	  and	  adaptation	  among	  varied	  social	  forms	  under	  conditions	  of	  competition	  within	  social	  environments.	  	  The	  term	  ‘social	  forms’	  here	  is	  deliberately	  highly	  general,	  covering	  organizations,	  institutions,	  conventions,	  ideas,	  ideologies,	  technologies,	  and	  so	  oniii.	  	  Social	  forms	  are	  maintained,	  altered,	  and	  eliminated	  through	  human	  use	  and	  disuse,	  but	  they	  do	  not	  ‘reproduce’	  themselves.	  	  The	  distinction	  between	  ‘social	  forms’	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and	  ‘environments’	  is	  heuristic,	  because	  any	  social	  environment	  is	  made	  up	  of	  other	  social	  forms,	  any	  of	  which	  may	  be	  evolving	  in	  relation	  to	  those	  affecting	  it.	  	  And,	  while	  myriad	  social	  forms	  aggregate	  into	  what	  we	  loosely	  call	  ‘societies’,	  whether	  societies	  as	  a	  whole	  evolve	  (see	  Parsons	  1977,	  Nolan	  and	  Lenski	  2006)	  is	  a	  difficult	  question,	  and	  one	  left	  aside	  by	  the	  focus	  on	  social	  forms,	  which	  do	  not	  respect	  putative	  societal	  boundaries.	  
Three	  fundamental	  issues	  in	  the	  social	  evolution	  literature	  should	  be	  addressed	  before	  proceeding.	  	  First,	  there	  is	  wide	  agreement	  in	  the	  literature	  that	  social	  evolution	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  any	  idea	  of	  progress,	  improvement	  or	  human	  betterment	  (see	  Blute	  2010:	  3-­‐7).	  	  Darwin	  was	  cautious	  and	  ambiguous	  on	  this	  point,	  but	  he	  did	  not	  see	  his	  theory	  as	  in	  any	  simple	  and	  direct	  way	  implying	  social	  progress,	  despite	  the	  widespread	  nineteenth-­‐century	  tendency	  to	  bend	  the	  idea	  to	  this	  purpose	  (Lewins	  2007:	  249-­‐58;	  Ruse	  1997).	  	  And	  current	  theories	  of	  biological	  evolution	  have	  predominantly	  abandoned	  any	  such	  notion	  (Futuyma	  2013:	  304),	  so	  there	  is	  no	  logical	  reason	  why	  it	  should	  be	  attached	  to	  a	  theory	  of	  social	  evolution,	  which	  would	  be	  hindered	  in	  its	  analytic	  capacity	  by	  such	  confusioniv.	  	  Second,	  although	  there	  are	  fields—sociobiology	  (Alexander	  1974),	  evolutionary	  psychology	  (Buss	  1999)—that	  look	  for	  the	  biological	  and	  genetic	  roots	  of	  human	  behaviour,	  and	  the	  emerging	  field	  of	  ‘coevolution’	  that	  concerns	  itself	  more	  with	  the	  mutually	  shaping	  effects	  of	  gene-­‐culture	  interaction	  (Durham	  1991;	  Richerson	  and	  Boyd	  2005:	  ch	  6)	  those	  are	  not	  my	  concern	  here.	  	  Thirdly,	  a	  basic	  theoretical	  question	  is	  whether	  the	  relationship	  between	  evolutionary	  concepts	  and	  theories	  in	  the	  biological	  and	  social	  spheres	  is	  one	  of	  analogy—using	  analogies	  from	  the	  biological	  to	  help	  understand	  the	  social—or	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one	  of	  both	  areas	  of	  theory	  reflecting	  a	  common	  underlying	  theory	  of	  change	  and	  causation	  (Blute	  2010:	  11).	  	  Hodgson	  and	  Knudsen	  (2010:	  ch	  2	  and	  passim)	  are	  adamant	  that	  the	  latter	  is	  the	  case,	  and	  argue	  convincingly	  that	  attempts	  to	  draw	  exhaustive	  analogies	  between	  the	  two	  domains	  will	  be	  problematic	  due	  to	  fundamental	  differences	  between	  biology	  and	  culture.	  	  	  I	  agree	  with	  this	  point,	  but	  am	  agnostic	  about	  the	  thesis	  of	  a	  higher	  order	  conceptual	  unity.	  	  	  However,	  in	  my	  view	  one	  can	  argue	  for	  the	  utility	  of	  judiciously	  chosen	  analogies,	  while	  allowing	  that	  it	  may	  eventually	  be	  shown	  that	  the	  utility	  of	  analogy	  is	  in	  fact	  due	  to	  shared	  derivation	  from	  underlying	  logical	  principles.	  
Having	  said	  this,	  I	  think	  one	  particularly	  influential	  attempt	  at	  analogy	  has	  been	  unhelpful.	  	  The	  primary	  culprit	  here	  is	  Richard	  Dawkins’	  (1989,	  orig.	  1976)	  concept	  of	  the	  ‘meme’,	  roughly	  a	  unit	  of	  heritable	  cultural	  information.	  	  This	  has	  been	  picked	  up	  across	  several	  disciplines,	  including	  psychology	  (Blackmore	  1999),	  philosophy	  (Dennett	  1995)	  and	  sociology	  (Runciman	  2009)v.	  	  	  The	  assumption	  seems	  to	  be	  that	  the	  gene	  is	  the	  basic	  building	  block	  of	  evolutionary	  theory,	  and	  thus	  without	  something	  corresponding	  to	  it	  social	  evolutionary	  theory	  is	  weakened.	  	  But	  this	  is	  clearly	  wrong.	  	  Darwin’s	  theory	  of	  evolution	  was	  lucidly	  and	  compellingly	  articulated	  without	  a	  theory	  of	  genetics,	  which	  came	  much	  later.	  	  	  Be	  this	  as	  it	  may,	  the	  current	  tendency	  among	  scholars	  working	  in	  this	  area	  has	  been	  to	  distance	  themselves	  from	  this	  concept,	  acknowledging	  the	  difficulties	  arising	  from	  the	  facile	  analogy	  to	  genes	  with	  their	  relatively	  clear	  and	  particulate	  natures	  (e.g.	  Mesoudi	  2011:	  41-­‐43).	  	  	  The	  main	  tendency	  has	  been	  to	  replace	  the	  meme	  concept	  with	  emphasis	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  ‘cultural	  transmission’	  (Mesoudi	  2011:	  58-­‐62)	  and/or	  ‘social	  learning’	  (Blute	  2010;	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Richerson	  and	  Boyd	  2005).	  	  In	  effect,	  the	  processes	  of	  reproduction	  and	  inheritance	  are	  identified	  less	  narrowly	  with	  the	  hypothetical	  ‘unit	  of	  information’	  that	  is	  passed	  on,	  and	  more	  with	  the	  relationship	  of	  transfer	  between	  ‘demonstrators’	  and	  ‘learners’.	  	  	  This	  also	  tends	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  way	  of	  making	  a	  clear	  case	  for	  ‘cultural	  evolution’	  because	  one	  of	  the	  most	  standard	  and	  minimal	  definitions	  of	  culture,	  in	  anthropology	  at	  least,	  is	  ‘that	  which	  is	  learned’	  (cf.	  Blute	  2010:	  30-­‐31;	  Richerson	  and	  Boyd	  2005:	  5)vi.	  	  	  
This	  emphasis	  on	  cultural	  transmission	  and	  social	  learning	  is	  preferable	  to	  the	  meme	  concept,	  but	  it	  also	  raises	  problems.	  	  First	  of	  all,	  the	  meme-­‐idea	  tends	  to	  haunt	  this	  approach,	  because	  that	  which	  is	  ‘learned’	  is	  still	  generally	  conceived	  as	  some	  kind	  of	  unit	  of	  knowledge	  or	  ‘information’	  that	  is	  transferred	  between	  minds.	  	  Shifting	  attention	  to	  the	  ‘act	  of	  replication’	  does	  not	  entirely	  resolve	  problems	  with	  the	  misleadingly	  particulate	  conception	  of	  the	  unit	  transferred.	  	  Secondly,	  because	  culture	  is	  understood	  ultimately	  as	  information	  that	  is	  transferred	  from	  mind	  to	  mind,	  much	  as	  genes	  are	  transferred	  from	  body	  to	  body,	  there	  is	  a	  misleading	  individualism	  involved	  here.	  	  	  Mesoudi,	  for	  instance,	  bemoans	  the	  ‘reluctance	  to	  reduce	  cultural	  phenomena	  to	  individual	  psychological	  processes’	  (2011:	  52),	  believing	  that	  such	  reduction	  is	  necessary	  for	  adequate	  explanation.	  	  I	  accept	  that	  cultural,	  psychological	  and	  even	  biological	  processes	  are	  mutually	  involved	  to	  some	  degree.	  	  There	  is	  no	  purely	  autonomous	  realm	  of	  the	  ‘superorganic’	  (Kroeber	  1917;	  Sapir	  1917)	  for	  untainted	  cultural	  analysis.	  	  But	  this	  perspective	  fails	  to	  recognise	  the	  ways	  knowledge	  and	  dispositions	  are	  sustained	  directly	  through	  the	  shaping	  influence	  of	  organisations,	  institutions,	  social	  networks	  and	  artefacts,	  as	  such,	  without	  any	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particular,	  necessary	  route	  through	  individual	  minds	  themselves	  (cf.	  Douglas	  1986;	  Tilly	  1984:	  26-­‐33;	  Wuthnow	  1987:	  ch	  6).	  	  I	  question	  the	  assumption	  that	  cultural	  change	  can	  only	  be	  explained	  through	  discreet	  moments	  of	  ‘reproduction’,	  of	  copying.	  	  	  It	  is	  not	  that	  social	  learning	  isn’t	  important,	  simply	  that	  it	  doesn’t	  encompass	  the	  mechanisms	  by	  which	  human	  knowledge	  and	  behaviour	  is	  sustained	  and	  altered.	  	  	  Finally,	  the	  illustrations	  we	  use	  tend	  to	  confirm	  the	  biases	  in	  our	  concepts.	  	  This	  perspective	  lends	  itself	  especially	  to	  being	  illustrated	  by	  examples	  from	  technology	  and	  artefacts,	  where	  ‘ideas’	  are	  very	  clearly	  materially	  encoded	  in	  various	  ‘generations’	  of	  the	  object	  in	  question	  (e.g.	  flint	  projectile	  points,	  steam	  engines,	  texts).	  	  I	  have	  no	  disagreement	  with	  the	  application	  of	  evolutionary	  concepts	  and	  phylogenetic	  analysis	  to	  these	  areas.	  	  But	  much	  of	  what	  we	  want	  to	  understand	  in	  terms	  of	  systemic	  social	  change	  involves	  social	  forms	  that	  are	  more	  complex	  and	  less	  easily	  objectified,	  and	  do	  not	  easily	  lend	  themselves	  to	  a	  paradigm	  of	  descending	  generations.	  	  
Corresponding	  to	  these	  objections	  is	  the	  minimal	  presence	  of	  concepts	  of	  social	  organisation	  (formal	  and	  informal)	  in	  many	  of	  the	  key	  texts	  in	  this	  literature	  (e.g.	  in:	  Blute	  2010,	  Mesoudi	  2011,	  Richerson	  and	  Boyd	  2005,	  Runciman	  2009).	  	  My	  own	  interest	  in	  this	  area	  derives	  from	  the	  earlier	  anthropological	  tradition	  of	  cultural	  ecology	  and	  long-­‐term	  political	  evolution	  (Steward	  1972;	  Service	  1975;	  Fried	  1967),	  in	  which	  questions	  of	  social	  organisation	  both	  at	  the	  encompassing	  level	  of	  types	  of	  societal	  organisation	  (‘bands,	  tribes,	  chiefdoms,	  states’),	  and	  the	  embedded	  level	  of	  key	  organisations	  that	  develop	  within	  that	  larger	  context	  (military	  units,	  religious	  sects,	  guilds,	  secret	  societies,	  economic	  firms,	  and	  so	  on	  
ad	  infinitum),	  are	  primary	  components	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  social	  change.	  	  I	  find	  it	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odd	  that	  these	  are	  not	  given	  a	  larger	  place	  in	  attempts	  to	  construct	  a	  general	  theory	  of	  social	  evolution.	  	  The	  notable	  exception	  to	  this	  is	  Hodgson	  and	  Knudsen	  (2010,	  esp.	  ch	  7),	  and	  this	  is	  likely	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  work	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  business	  studies	  and	  organisational	  design,	  respectively.	  	  They	  recognise	  the	  importance	  of	  organisational	  form	  for	  social	  change,	  and	  the	  applicability	  of	  evolutionary	  concepts	  to	  that	  domain.	  	  	  Using	  the	  illustrative	  case	  of	  the	  development	  of	  economic	  firms,	  they	  observe	  that	  these	  don't	  simply	  reproduce	  themselves,	  but	  also	  merge,	  takeover,	  and	  spin-­‐off,	  thus	  confronting	  the	  complexities	  of	  organisational	  evolution.	  
Their	  approach	  is	  built	  around	  a	  key	  distinction	  between	  ‘replicators’	  and	  ‘interactors’	  (made	  by	  Hull	  2001:	  ch	  1).	  	  In	  biology	  the	  paradigmatic	  replicators	  are	  genes,	  and	  the	  paradigmatic	  interactors	  are	  organisms	  (or,	  at	  higher	  a	  level,	  species).	  	  To	  transfer	  this	  analytic	  logic	  to	  human	  social	  organisations	  they	  speak	  of	  ‘routines’	  and	  organisational	  ‘positions’	  (or	  ‘roles’,	  a	  term	  I	  find	  easier	  here	  but	  they	  reserve	  for	  another	  purpose)	  as	  the	  corresponding	  replicators,	  whose	  survival	  and	  reproduction	  depends	  on	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  carrying	  organisation	  (interactor).	  	  This	  helps	  get	  them	  away	  from	  the	  ‘ghost	  of	  the	  meme’,	  routines	  and	  roles	  being	  somewhat	  less	  like	  units	  of	  transferable	  information,	  and	  closer	  to	  what	  are	  often	  called	  ‘practices’.	  	  	  I	  think	  this	  is	  an	  improvement,	  although	  I	  am	  still	  not	  certain	  it	  doesn’t	  over-­‐abstract	  from	  what	  actually	  sustains	  diverse	  forms	  of	  social	  organisation.	  	  Granted	  there	  are	  routines	  and	  roles,	  and	  also	  ideas	  and	  bodies	  of	  knowledge.	  	  But	  there	  are	  also	  sentiments,	  ties	  of	  affect,	  networks,	  implicit	  conventions,	  and	  much	  more,	  all	  of	  which,	  in	  complex	  interaction	  with	  the	  other	  ‘replicators’	  usually	  highlighted,	  contribute	  to	  whether	  organisations	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thrive,	  survive,	  or	  fail.	  	  All	  this	  is	  simply	  to	  say	  that,	  across	  this	  literature,	  the	  theorisation	  of	  ‘replicators’	  strikes	  me	  as	  unfinished	  and	  still	  a	  bit	  premature.	  	  Moreover,	  while	  I	  think	  it	  is	  perfectly	  legitimate	  to	  try	  to	  develop	  such	  generalised	  concepts,	  I	  am	  not	  convinced	  it	  is	  immediately	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  continue	  to	  develop	  a	  theory	  of	  organisational	  evolution,	  especially	  as	  applied	  to	  major	  organisational	  forms.	  	  I	  return	  to	  the	  key	  point:	  Darwin	  developed	  a	  compelling	  theory	  of	  evolution	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  well-­‐understood	  ‘replicating’	  mechanism	  (the	  gene).	  	  I	  doubt	  whether	  there	  is	  any	  single	  corresponding	  concept	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  social	  evolution,	  and	  see	  no	  logical	  reason	  why	  there	  should	  be.	  	  Finally,	  all	  this	  is	  pertinent	  to	  the	  present	  argument,	  because	  the	  idea	  that	  power-­‐to	  expands	  with	  power-­‐over	  is,	  in	  effect,	  a	  statement	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  social	  organisation	  and	  why	  it	  is	  so	  highly	  elaborated	  in	  humans.	  	  Yes,	  we	  are	  increasingly	  empowered	  by	  our	  technologies	  and	  capacity	  to	  learn,	  but	  social	  organisation,	  the	  complex	  division	  of	  labour,	  is	  in	  my	  view	  equally,	  if	  not	  more	  important.	  
A	  key	  issue	  in	  all	  of	  this	  is	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘levels	  of	  selection’.	  	  In	  biological	  evolution	  there	  are	  debates	  about	  what	  is	  most	  important,	  but	  also	  consensus	  that	  there	  can	  be	  selection	  processes	  that	  operate	  at	  different	  levels—on	  genes,	  on	  organisms,	  on	  groups/populations,	  and	  on	  species	  a	  whole	  (Futuyma	  2013:	  292-­‐5).	  	  In	  Dawkins’	  (1989)	  ‘selfish	  gene’	  approach	  there	  is	  a	  tendency	  to	  prioritise	  the	  gene,	  to	  suggest	  that	  an	  organism,	  and	  all	  higher	  levels	  of	  biological	  organisation,	  are	  simply	  the	  means	  for	  genes	  to	  reproduce	  themselves.	  	  This	  assumption	  carries	  through	  to	  the	  rather	  looser	  conception	  of	  memes	  (cf.	  Blackmore	  1999).	  	  Despite	  the	  shift	  from	  ‘memes’	  to	  ‘social	  learning’	  much	  of	  the	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literature	  on	  sociocultural	  evolution	  seems	  similarly	  preoccupied	  with	  the	  differential	  capacity	  of	  ‘replicators’	  (habits,	  customs,	  roles,	  routines,	  tools,	  languages,	  ideas,	  and	  so	  on)	  to	  replicate,	  and	  less	  interested	  in	  the	  organisational	  forms	  through	  which	  they	  must	  replicate,	  and	  which	  are	  themselves	  the	  object	  of	  selection.	  	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  this	  ‘replicator-­‐focus’	  is	  illegitimate,	  and	  it	  is	  understandable	  that	  it	  might	  be	  especially	  relevant	  to	  certain	  kinds	  of	  research	  such	  as	  the	  histories	  of	  science	  and	  technology.	  	  But	  there	  seems	  in	  many	  quarters	  to	  be	  a	  strange	  lack	  of	  interest	  in	  the	  dynamics	  and	  processes	  of	  competitive	  selection	  specific	  to	  the	  various	  kinds	  of	  social	  organisation—families,	  households,	  firms,	  voluntary	  associations,	  political	  parties,	  religious	  sects,	  states,	  and	  so	  on—that	  are	  the	  ordinary	  foci	  of	  sociological	  study,	  and	  were	  mainstays	  of	  an	  earlier	  evolutionary	  anthropology.	  	  Of	  course,	  such	  organisations	  are	  to	  some	  degree	  constituted	  as	  collections	  of	  ‘replicators’	  out	  of	  which	  they	  are	  composed,	  but	  the	  sum	  will	  always	  be	  more	  than	  the	  parts,	  and	  it	  is	  the	  viability	  of	  the	  whole	  organisation	  that	  is	  often	  selected	  for	  or	  against.	  	  So	  a	  basic	  question	  in	  regard	  to	  social	  evolution,	  as	  in	  regard	  to	  biological	  evolution,	  is	  what	  level	  of	  selection	  are	  we	  interested	  in,	  and	  this	  will	  depend	  on	  the	  questions	  one	  is	  asking.	  
Taking	  their	  cue	  from	  Maynard	  Smith	  and	  Szathmáry’s	  (1995)	  study	  of	  major	  macro-­‐level	  transitions	  in	  biological	  evolution,	  Hodgson	  and	  Knudsen	  attempt	  to	  outline	  the	  same	  for	  social	  evolution	  in	  one	  of	  their	  last	  chapters	  (2010:	  ch	  8).	  	  They	  conceptualise	  this	  as	  a	  series	  of	  pivotal	  shifts	  in	  which	  new	  major	  forms	  of	  ‘replicators’	  and	  ‘interactors’	  emerge,	  each	  altering	  and	  tending	  to	  accelerate	  the	  process	  of	  change.	  	  They	  see	  human	  society	  building	  new	  levels	  on	  top	  of	  the	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original	  baseline	  of	  genetic	  evolution.	  	  In	  summary:	  First	  early	  forms	  of	  hominid	  culture	  based	  on	  the	  general	  capacity	  for	  social	  learning	  and	  embodied	  habits	  consolidate	  the	  formation	  of	  basic	  social	  groups	  (‘bands’).	  	  Then	  language	  in	  the	  full	  sense	  arises,	  facilitiating	  more	  complex	  learning	  and	  collective	  behaviour,	  and	  eventually	  more	  complex	  and	  hierarchicised	  forms	  of	  kinship-­‐based	  social	  organisation.	  	  This	  would	  be	  during	  the	  period	  that	  archaeologists	  generally	  call	  the	  ‘upper	  paleolithic’,	  c.50,000-­‐10,000	  years	  ago.	  	  Then	  writing,	  associated	  with	  the	  coming	  of	  civilisations	  and	  archaic	  states,	  is	  the	  next	  great	  replication	  system	  to	  emerge.	  	  Next,	  also	  associated	  with,	  perhaps	  even	  diagnostic	  of,	  the	  formation	  of	  early	  states,	  are	  legal	  systems,	  which	  are	  able	  to	  encode,	  impose	  by	  force,	  and	  reproduce	  much	  more	  elaborate	  regulation	  of	  social	  behaviour,	  thus	  making	  these	  new	  larger	  forms	  of	  social	  and	  political	  organisation	  possible.	  	  Finally,	  they	  identify	  science	  and	  science-­‐based	  technology	  as	  the	  last	  major	  emergent	  replicating	  system,	  which	  like	  law,	  creates	  a	  relatively	  stable	  and	  expanding	  body	  of	  knowledge,	  although	  in	  this	  case,	  about	  the	  natural	  world	  rather	  than	  moral	  injunction.	  	  They	  also	  note	  that	  this	  last	  system	  has	  an	  elective	  affinity	  with	  more	  open,	  democratic,	  and	  commercial	  forms	  of	  social	  organisation.	  	  Throughout	  this	  account	  they	  tend	  to	  characterise	  these	  levels	  as	  transformations	  of	  the	  complexity	  of	  information	  and	  its	  communication,	  thus	  accenting	  the	  role	  of	  new	  forms	  of	  replicators,	  or	  better,	  replicating	  systems	  (i.e.,	  habit,	  language,	  writing,	  law,	  science),	  in	  this	  long-­‐term	  process.	  	  But	  as	  I’ve	  indicated	  in	  this	  brief	  summary,	  although	  they	  leave	  it	  somewhat	  in	  the	  background,	  theirs	  is	  also	  a	  summary	  of	  emerging	  forms	  of	  interactors,	  namely,	  dominant	  forms	  of	  social	  organisation,	  from	  small	  bands,	  to	  complex	  kinship	  structures,	  to	  archaic	  and	  modern	  states,	  with	  subsidiary	  forms	  of	  organisation	  developing	  and	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proliferating	  within	  these.	  	  As	  they	  observe,	  the	  more	  complex	  forms	  of	  social	  organisation,	  that	  seem	  to	  be	  the	  affordances	  of	  innovative	  replication	  systems,	  significantly	  increase	  in	  social	  power.	  	  They	  remark	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  more	  complex	  kin-­‐based	  social	  forms	  following	  on	  from	  the	  emergence	  of	  language	  that:	  
Hierarchical	  societies	  with	  differentiated	  social	  positions	  probably	  outcompeted	  their	  less	  complex	  rivals	  for	  several	  reasons.	  	  The	  more	  complex	  division	  of	  labor	  led	  to	  enhanced	  skill	  formation	  and	  greater	  productivity	  in	  the	  provision	  of	  food	  and	  other	  basic	  needs.	  	  It	  also	  led	  to	  more	  effective	  warrior	  groups.	  	  Rivals	  could	  be	  defeated	  as	  long	  as	  these	  advantages	  were	  not	  negated	  by	  the	  disadvantages	  of	  a	  more	  ossified	  social	  structure.	  	  Some	  degree	  of	  hierarchy	  provided	  advantages	  in	  terms	  of	  coordination	  and	  cohesion	  (2010:	  194).	  
I	  am	  in	  full	  agreement.	  	  This	  is	  a	  succinct	  statement	  of	  the	  entwined	  relationship	  between	  power-­‐to	  and	  power-­‐over.	  	  However,	  they	  schematically	  represent	  language	  (‘the	  replicator’)	  as	  coming	  first,	  yielding	  the	  emergence	  of	  more	  complex	  social	  structures	  (‘the	  interactor’).	  	  But	  theorists	  of	  language	  origins	  are	  inclined	  to	  argue	  the	  close	  interaction	  of	  the	  development	  of	  language	  and	  sociality,	  each	  being	  a	  condition	  stimulating	  the	  other.	  	  	  So	  again,	  a	  certain	  implicit	  prioritisation	  of	  replicators	  over	  interactors	  may	  be	  misleading	  here.	  	  	  	  
Having	  presented	  my	  general	  take	  on,	  and	  reservations	  about,	  current	  social	  evolutionary	  theory,	  I	  now	  turn	  to	  an	  example	  comparative	  historical	  sociology,	  and	  make	  a	  case	  for	  thinking	  about	  long-­‐term	  human	  history	  in	  social	  evolutionary	  terms.	  
	   16	  
Power	  To/Over	  and	  Human	  History	  
From	  here	  on	  I	  want	  to	  relate	  what	  has	  been	  said	  to	  the	  broad	  sweep	  of	  human	  history,	  understood	  as	  the	  long	  and	  vast	  development	  of	  human	  social	  power.	  	  It	  makes	  sense	  to	  start	  with	  the	  most	  imposing	  contemporary	  effort	  to	  do	  this,	  Michael	  Mann’s	  four-­‐volume	  Sources	  of	  Social	  Power	  (1986,	  1993,	  2012,	  2013).	  	  This	  makes	  sense	  particularly	  because	  Mann	  makes	  the	  argument	  in	  volume	  one	  of	  Sources	  that	  his	  story	  largely	  begins	  where	  ‘general	  social	  evolution’	  ends	  and	  history	  begins.	  	  I	  can	  perhaps	  clarify	  my	  position	  by	  explaining	  why	  I	  disagree.	  	  As	  Mann	  puts	  it:	  
So,	  in	  this	  chapter	  [2	  of	  volume	  1]	  I	  set	  the	  scene	  for	  a	  later	  history	  of	  power.	  	  It	  will	  always	  be	  a	  history	  of	  particular	  places,	  for	  that	  has	  been	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  development	  of	  power.	  	  The	  general	  capacities	  of	  human	  beings	  faced	  with	  their	  earthly	  environment	  gave	  rise	  to	  the	  first	  societies—to	  agriculture,	  the	  village,	  the	  clan,	  the	  lineage,	  the	  chiefdom—but	  not	  to	  civilization,	  stratification	  or	  the	  state.	  	  Our	  thanks,	  or	  curses,	  for	  that	  are	  due	  to	  more	  particular	  historical	  circumstances	  (1986:	  40,	  emphasis	  in	  original).	  
In	  this	  way	  Mann	  argues	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  evolution	  is	  applicable	  to	  early	  human	  history,	  before	  the	  full	  arrival	  of	  the	  state,	  because	  the	  developments	  enumerated	  in	  the	  quote,	  agriculture	  etc.,	  all	  reflect	  general,	  even	  universal	  human	  tendencies,	  which	  were	  likely	  to,	  and	  did	  arise	  in	  various	  separate	  contexts.	  	  But	  the	  state,	  with	  its	  capacity	  to	  ‘cage’	  people	  and	  lock	  them	  into	  its	  systems	  of	  stratification,	  is	  not	  a	  result	  of	  general	  tendencies,	  but	  rather	  unique	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contingent	  events	  that	  occurred	  in	  a	  particular	  way,	  arising	  first	  in	  Mesopotamia,	  and	  then	  spreading	  outward,	  in	  a	  ramifying	  but	  particularistic	  path.	  	  	  
I	  have	  various	  problems	  with	  this	  narrative.	  First	  and	  quite	  simply,	  the	  existence	  of	  pre-­‐Columbian	  New	  World	  states	  such	  as	  those	  of	  the	  Maya,	  Aztec	  and	  the	  Inca	  implies	  the	  ‘independent	  invention’	  of	  	  ‘civilisation’,	  ‘stratification’	  and	  ‘the	  state’.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  that	  this	  path	  of	  development	  might	  be	  more	  general	  and	  less	  particular	  than	  Mann	  implies.	  	  Elsewhere	  Mann	  (Ibid.:	  74)	  suggests	  that	  even	  if	  we	  acknowledge	  the	  Mesoamerican	  cases,	  there	  are	  still	  too	  few	  cases	  of	  the	  independent	  development	  of	  civilization	  to	  treat	  it	  as	  anything	  other	  than	  particularistic.	  	  I	  am	  not	  convinced.	  	  Second,	  there	  is	  at	  least	  a	  hint	  in	  Mann’s	  thesis	  that	  the	  caging	  and	  stratifying	  effects	  of	  civilization	  are	  ‘historical’	  and	  ‘particular’	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  not	  a	  necessary	  part	  of	  human	  nature.	  	  That	  which	  is	  accidental	  can	  in	  theory	  at	  least,	  be	  undone,	  or	  avoided	  in	  the	  future.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  shift	  from	  ‘evolution’	  to	  ‘history’	  might	  be	  construed	  as	  providing	  a	  narrative	  of	  movement,	  to	  put	  it	  figuratively,	  from	  a	  ‘state	  of	  nature’	  to	  a	  more	  ‘fallen’	  condition	  of	  power-­‐tainted	  historical	  beings.	  	  I	  am	  not	  saying	  that	  this	  is	  what	  Mann	  intends,	  but	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  temporal	  boundary,	  with	  different	  rules	  of	  social	  change	  on	  either	  side,	  seems	  almost	  metaphysical.	  	  Finally	  and	  most	  fundamentally,	  I	  question	  the	  idea	  that	  evolution	  concerns	  the	  ‘general’	  and	  history	  the	  ‘particular’.	  	  This	  strikes	  me	  as	  a	  misleading	  distinction.	  	  Evolution	  tries	  to	  define	  some	  general	  parameters	  within	  which	  particular	  processes	  take	  place.	  	  But	  unique,	  particularistic	  events,	  that	  send	  evolutionary	  developments	  along	  a	  particular	  path,	  are	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  theory.	  	  From	  random	  but	  advantageous	  mutations	  on	  up	  to	  the	  meteor	  strike	  that	  supposedly	  triggered	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the	  KT	  boundary	  mass	  extinctions,	  unique	  events	  are	  involved.	  	  Within	  Mann’s	  own	  discussion,	  I	  see	  no	  reason	  to	  categorise	  the	  various	  independent	  discoveries	  of	  agricultural	  practices	  as	  examples	  of	  ‘general	  evolution’,	  but	  the	  independent	  developments	  of	  state	  formation	  as	  examples	  of	  ‘particular	  history’.	  	  Both	  happened	  more	  than	  once,	  independently,	  but	  were	  also	  of	  such	  significance	  that	  they	  tended	  to	  spread	  along	  direct	  causal	  pathways,	  as	  outcomes	  of	  those	  relatively	  unique	  events.	  	  Evolutionary	  theory	  tells	  us	  that	  environmental	  adaptation	  will	  be	  a	  key	  factor	  in	  the	  persistence	  or	  disappearance	  of	  forms	  in	  specific	  contexts.	  	  It	  does	  not	  require	  parallel,	  directional	  movement	  towards	  similar	  ends,	  and	  where	  this	  does	  happen	  it	  is	  attributed	  to	  similar	  conditions.	  	  Indeed	  the	  wider	  tendency	  of	  evolution	  is	  toward	  diversification	  and	  differentiation,	  towards	  increasing	  particularity	  as	  variants	  adapt	  to	  environments.	  	  There	  is	  no	  overarching	  narrative,	  merely	  a	  logical	  train	  of	  causation	  that	  can	  be	  reconstructed	  after	  the	  fact.	  	  	  Considering	  this	  from	  the	  ‘history	  end’,	  Mann’s	  approach	  to	  history,	  as	  with	  all	  comparative	  and	  historical	  sociologists,	  is	  not	  defined	  by	  its	  particularism,	  but	  precisely	  by	  its	  effort	  to	  identify	  broad	  over-­‐arching	  patterns	  and	  rules	  of	  thumb—to	  find	  the	  general	  in	  the	  particular.	  	  For	  instance,	  Mann’s	  idea	  of	  ‘interstitial	  emergence’	  (1986:	  16),	  that	  social	  actors	  will	  form	  novel	  social	  networks	  and	  institutions	  in	  the	  spaces	  between	  dominant	  ones,	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  sometimes	  transformative	  for	  wider	  society,	  looks	  very	  much	  like	  an	  evolutionary	  hypothesis	  to	  me.	  	  The	  distance	  between	  comparative	  history	  and	  social	  evolution	  is	  not	  as	  far	  as	  he	  suggests	  it	  is.	  	  Evolutionary	  theory	  explains	  order	  amid	  contingency	  and	  particularity—not	  in	  opposition	  to	  thesevii.	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Returning	  to	  the	  question	  of	  power	  to/over,	  I	  will	  first	  sketch	  its	  relevance	  for	  our	  conceptualization	  of	  two	  great	  transitions	  in	  human	  history,	  the	  Neolithic	  and	  Industrial	  ‘Revolutions’,	  before	  examining	  more	  closely	  its	  significance	  for	  the	  social	  organisation	  of	  modern,	  capitalist,	  democratic,	  liberal	  society.	  	  This	  will	  include	  some	  speculations	  on	  the	  tendency	  of	  a	  certain	  social	  form,	  ‘competition’,	  to	  be	  selected	  for	  in	  this	  kind	  of	  society.	  
The	  Neolithic	  Revolution	  involved	  the	  combined	  processes	  of	  creating	  horticulture	  (simple,	  low	  technology	  agriculture)	  beyond	  incipient	  forms,	  such	  that	  new	  and	  larger	  sedentary	  village	  settlements	  could	  be	  maintained	  year-­‐round.	  	  Whereas	  previously	  populations	  had	  relied	  for	  subsistence	  on	  foraging	  and	  hunting,	  these	  now	  became	  secondary	  in	  these	  populations.	  	  This	  process	  was	  of	  course	  not	  as	  sudden	  as	  the	  term	  ‘revolution’	  makes	  it	  sound,	  but	  the	  ultimate	  implications	  of	  this	  change	  were	  profound.	  	  It	  led	  not	  only	  to	  larger	  and	  denser	  settlements	  with	  more	  permanent	  structures,	  but	  increasing	  manufacture	  of	  tools	  and	  other	  items	  for	  daily	  use,	  no	  longer	  limited	  by	  a	  need	  for	  regular	  portability	  characteristic	  of	  small,	  mobile	  foraging	  groups.	  	  	  It	  also	  created	  the	  initial	  basis	  for	  the	  growth	  of	  trade	  and	  commerce	  between	  groups	  as	  these	  commanded	  different	  local	  resources.	  	  This	  in	  turn	  seems	  to	  have	  helped	  stimulate	  differentiation	  and	  specialization	  within	  the	  community	  as	  a	  more	  diverse	  repertoire	  of	  tasks	  and	  roles	  was	  needed.	  It	  also	  appears	  that	  with	  growing	  populations	  and	  numbers	  of	  settlements	  creating	  greater	  pressures	  on	  land	  and	  resources,	  that	  this	  form	  of	  social	  organisation	  under	  some	  circumstances	  led	  to	  the	  development	  of	  early	  forms	  of	  feuding	  and	  ‘warfare’	  between	  groups.	  	  Politically,	  this	  shift	  corresponds	  to	  an	  increasing	  role	  for	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community	  leaders	  involved	  in	  mobilizing	  activity	  and	  resources,	  particularly	  during	  times	  of	  stress.	  	  While	  typically	  such	  leaders	  lacked	  any	  coercive	  means,	  and	  operated	  largely	  through	  reputation	  and	  exhortation,	  they	  nonetheless	  indicate	  a	  certain	  formalisation	  of	  the	  need	  for	  communal	  coordination.	  	  Eventually	  this	  shift	  provided	  the	  basic	  conditions	  for	  the	  rise	  in	  some	  cases	  of	  more	  concentrated	  power	  in	  the	  form	  of	  privileged	  hereditary	  lineages	  that	  monopolised	  access	  to	  community	  leadership	  (‘chiefdoms’),	  and	  hierarchies	  of	  rulership	  spanning	  multiple	  settlements.	  	  And	  these	  in	  turn	  would	  provide	  the	  platform	  for	  the	  rise	  of	  early	  states	  underwritten	  by	  more	  extensive	  and	  intensive	  forms	  agriculture	  and	  legitimated	  by	  theistic	  cosmologies	  (Mann’s	  ‘civilisation’).	  	  	  Although	  it	  was	  long	  and	  contingent	  process	  of	  several	  millennia,	  the	  initial	  ‘neolithic	  revolution’	  of	  about	  10,000	  years	  ago	  eventually	  supplied	  conditions	  for	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  first	  complex,	  state-­‐based	  societies	  about	  5,000	  years	  ago.	  	  	  
The	  question	  has	  often	  been	  asked:	  why	  on	  Earth	  would	  people	  so	  free	  ever	  submit	  to	  the	  complex	  hierarchies	  of	  civilization?	  (e.g.	  Wenke	  and	  Olszewski	  2007:	  279).	  	  In	  the	  first	  place,	  many	  of	  these	  changes	  probably	  happened	  so	  gradually,	  over	  many	  generations,	  that	  people	  were	  not	  aware	  of	  how	  much	  things	  were	  changing.	  	  	  But	  it	  is	  also	  the	  case	  that	  the	  archaeological	  and	  historical	  records	  indicate	  cases	  of	  people	  ‘refusing	  the	  offer’,	  of	  complex	  systems	  falling	  apart,	  and	  sometimes	  not	  just	  through	  systemic	  collapse,	  but	  also	  active	  revoltviii.	  	  Although	  larger	  complex	  systems	  do	  eventually	  tend	  to	  ‘cage’	  populations	  in	  Mann’s	  apt	  term,	  in	  other	  words,	  it	  becomes	  very	  difficult	  to	  ‘turn	  back’,	  there	  is	  no	  unidirectional	  ‘ratchet’.	  	  But	  it	  seems	  inadequate	  to	  try	  to	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understand	  this	  process	  strictly	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  loss	  of	  freedom,	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  subordination	  of	  peoples	  to	  hierarchies.	  	  To	  view	  these	  changes	  through	  this	  lens	  is,	  in	  a	  sense	  anachronistic.	  	  It	  imposes	  a	  certain	  modern,	  Enlightenment	  based	  preference	  for	  and	  conception	  of	  ‘freedom’	  on	  the	  past.	  	  It	  seems	  entirely	  possible	  that	  as	  these	  processes	  were	  going	  on,	  people	  were	  aware	  of	  the	  complex	  trade-­‐offs	  they	  were	  involved	  in.	  	  They	  could	  see	  that	  the	  concentration	  of	  power	  above	  their	  heads	  was	  linked	  to	  the	  expansion	  of	  powers	  enjoyed	  by	  the	  average	  community	  member.	  	  Greater	  food	  resources,	  more	  varied	  built	  environments,	  more	  diverse	  social	  roles	  and	  opportunities,	  larger	  social	  fields	  from	  which	  to	  seek	  friendships,	  allies,	  and	  companions,	  defense	  against	  predation	  by	  other	  human	  groups,	  and	  many	  other	  abilities	  and	  opportunities	  came	  along	  with	  the	  growing	  complexity	  and	  hierarchy.	  	  It	  is	  with	  some	  condescension	  that	  we	  assume	  that	  our	  ancestors	  were	  not	  actively	  weighing	  the	  pros	  and	  cons	  of	  greater	  power-­‐to	  linked	  to	  greater	  power-­‐over,	  however	  limited	  their	  understanding	  of,	  and	  control	  over,	  the	  long-­‐term	  trends	  of	  social	  evolution.	  	  As	  I’ve	  suggested,	  there	  was	  no	  one	  historical	  moment	  of	  decision	  to	  accept	  such	  changes,	  but	  rather	  a	  long	  and	  fitful	  general	  shift	  in	  this	  direction.	  	  	  
Let	  us	  jump	  ahead	  to	  the	  ‘industrial	  revolution’.	  	  Again,	  this	  term	  conceptually	  isolates	  a	  process	  that	  emerges	  out	  of	  accumulating	  preconditions:	  advances	  in	  agriculture,	  navigation	  and	  shipbuilding,	  growing	  global	  trade,	  the	  expansion	  of	  communication	  and	  science	  through	  printing	  and	  literacy.	  	  However,	  a	  narrow	  definition	  from	  Nolan	  and	  Lenski	  is	  serviceable:	  
…the	  period	  during	  which	  the	  productive	  activities	  of	  societies	  were	  rapidly	  transformed	  by	  the	  invention	  of	  a	  succession	  of	  machines	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powered	  by	  newer,	  inanimate	  sources	  of	  energy,	  such	  as	  coal,	  electricity,	  petroleum,	  and	  natural	  gas	  (2006:	  193).	  
As	  we	  know	  the	  initial	  shift	  in	  this	  direction	  (c.	  1760-­‐1830)	  has	  been	  followed	  by	  subsequent	  waves	  of	  innovations	  in	  technologies,	  energy	  capture,	  and	  communications.	  	  The	  story	  of	  how	  this	  more	  material	  change	  corresponded	  to	  concurrent	  changes	  in	  political	  organisation	  is	  of	  course	  highly	  complex	  (cf.	  Spruyt	  1994).	  	  The	  initial	  path	  of	  cutting-­‐edge	  change	  was	  strongly	  associated	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  capitalism	  in	  Britain,	  and	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  British	  Empire,	  the	  dominant	  core	  of	  this	  process	  eventually	  passing	  on	  to	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  informal	  empire	  (to	  use	  Mann’s	  term,	  2013:	  86-­‐87).	  	  And	  we	  should	  remember	  that	  innovation	  in	  industrial	  forms	  of	  production	  happened	  throughout	  the	  complex	  colonial	  system,	  for	  instance	  in	  the	  Caribbean	  (e.g.	  Mintz	  1986),	  not	  just	  in	  the	  British	  mainland.	  	  In	  Prussia	  and	  the	  German	  lands,	  and	  later	  in	  Russia	  after	  the	  1917	  revolution,	  industrialisation	  was	  more	  driven	  from	  the	  top	  down	  in	  areas	  responding	  to	  the	  expansion	  of	  this	  capitalist	  power.	  	  Here	  I	  limit	  my	  observations	  more	  to	  the	  first	  variant,	  which	  I	  would	  argue	  is	  ultimately	  the	  dominant	  trend,	  at	  least	  so	  far.	  	  It	  is	  striking	  that	  the	  rise	  of	  agrarian	  and	  later	  industrial	  capitalism	  was	  accompanied	  by	  an	  ideological	  discourse	  that	  rejected	  the	  traditional	  rule	  by	  aristocratic	  strata	  based	  on	  inherited	  feudal	  structures,	  and	  championed	  the	  emancipation	  of	  the	  people	  and	  their	  right	  to	  self	  rule.	  	  How	  they	  would	  rule	  themselves,	  and	  that	  this	  would	  ultimately	  become	  institutionalized	  through	  democracy,	  was	  not	  readily	  apparent	  in	  the	  early	  days.	  	  Of	  course	  this	  was	  a	  complex	  process	  with	  many	  contrary	  trends:	  conservatism,	  socialism,	  communism,	  atheism	  versus	  religion,	  individualism	  versus	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collectivism,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  My	  main	  point	  however	  is	  that	  there	  was	  a	  powerful	  rhetorical	  trope	  in	  the	  political	  discourse,	  of	  rejecting	  and	  overcoming	  the	  power-­‐over	  of	  the	  past,	  and	  releasing	  the	  potential	  for	  power-­‐to	  among	  both	  individuals	  and	  societies.	  	  This	  Enlightenment	  idea,	  the	  now	  tarnished	  promise	  of	  modernity,	  still	  frames	  much	  of	  our	  thinking.	  	  	  
Things	  are	  never	  so	  simple	  of	  course.	  	  We	  know	  that	  the	  vast	  increase	  in	  our	  material	  powers,	  embodied	  in	  consumer	  choices	  and	  the	  technological	  expansion	  of	  our	  capacities	  for	  action	  has	  been	  accompanied	  by	  a	  massive	  increase	  in	  centralized	  powers,	  of	  states,	  and	  other	  large	  and	  dominant	  forms	  of	  organisation,	  most	  notably	  the	  modern	  corporation	  with	  transnational	  reach	  in	  its	  operations	  (Gomory	  and	  Sylla	  2013;	  Micklethwaite	  and	  Woolridge	  2005).	  	  As	  ever,	  the	  expansion	  of	  our	  power-­‐to	  is	  linked	  to	  the	  expansion	  of	  power-­‐over.	  	  And	  we	  are	  deeply	  culturally	  committed	  to	  this	  link.	  	  Few	  would	  want	  to	  see	  a	  decline	  in	  their	  personal	  powers	  to	  consume,	  indeed	  modern	  state	  legitimacy	  is	  generally	  premised	  on	  the	  ability	  to	  constantly	  deliver	  and	  expand	  this	  through	  economic	  growth	  (cf.	  Hall	  2013:	  247-­‐5).	  	  And	  few	  would	  choose	  to	  live	  in	  a	  state	  with	  weaker	  powers	  overall,	  even	  despite	  objections,	  from	  both	  right	  and	  left,	  to	  the	  ever-­‐expanding	  infrastructural	  powers	  of	  the	  modern	  state	  to	  monitor,	  regulate,	  expropriate	  and	  command	  its	  citizens.	  	  As	  contradictory	  as	  it	  is,	  the	  characteristic	  dream	  of	  the	  age	  is	  to	  be	  an	  empowered	  and	  autonomous	  individual,	  living	  within	  a	  powerful	  state	  that	  can	  protect	  our	  interests,	  while	  as	  free	  as	  possible	  from	  the	  intrusions	  of	  power	  from	  above.	  	  This	  is	  the	  paradoxical	  promise	  of	  liberal	  rule.	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My	  basic	  point	  here	  is	  that	  these	  two	  great	  transformations	  of	  human	  social	  relations,	  these	  two	  ‘revolutions’,	  can	  be	  effectively	  summarized	  as	  twinned	  expansions	  of	  power-­‐to	  and	  power-­‐over.	  	  Whatever	  the	  twists	  and	  turns	  of	  specific	  history,	  they	  suggest	  a	  long-­‐term	  bias	  in	  this	  direction,	  toward	  the	  intensification	  of	  power	  to/over.	  	  It	  is	  in	  this	  context	  that	  we	  need	  to	  understand	  liberal	  forms	  of	  society.	  	  Not	  simply	  as	  the	  epiphenomenal	  response	  to	  material	  and	  technological	  changes,	  nor	  as	  a	  superstructure	  of	  ideas	  and	  practices	  resting	  atop	  a	  capitalist	  economy,	  but	  as	  a	  form	  of	  social	  organisation,	  a	  way	  of	  legitimating	  predominant	  power	  relations,	  that	  is	  also	  constitutive	  of	  those	  power	  arrangements.	  	  The	  ‘paradox	  of	  liberal	  rule’	  isn’t	  necessarily	  a	  lie.	  	  The	  liberal	  democratic	  regimes	  that	  accompany	  liberal	  forms	  of	  society	  achieve	  greater	  power-­‐to,	  precisely	  by	  loosening	  the	  grip	  of	  the	  state’s	  power-­‐over	  to	  a	  degree,	  allowing	  greater	  scope	  for	  autonomous	  organisation	  and	  action	  within	  the	  economy	  and	  civil	  society.	  	  Precisely	  by	  releasing	  power	  within	  limits,	  governed	  by	  laws,	  they	  stimulate	  the	  inventive,	  productive	  and	  competitive	  activities	  that	  give	  liberal	  society	  its	  characteristic	  dynamic	  of	  innovation.	  	  Meanwhile	  the	  dispersion	  of	  power	  rebounds	  on	  the	  system	  as	  a	  whole,	  returning	  power	  to	  the	  centre.	  	  In	  simple	  economic	  terms,	  the	  generation	  of	  private	  wealth	  provides	  the	  tax	  base	  that	  supports	  a	  powerful	  state.	  	  But	  this	  is	  only	  one	  dimension.	  	  By	  allowing	  greater	  freedom	  of	  thought	  and	  public	  discourse,	  the	  available	  universe	  of	  ideas	  and	  discursive	  strategies	  is	  also	  expanded	  and	  made	  available	  to	  the	  wider	  system	  and	  the	  state.	  	  By	  allowing	  a	  degree	  of	  cultural	  and	  political	  pluralism,	  the	  system	  overall	  is	  strengthened	  (see	  Hearn	  2011	  for	  some	  elaboration).	  	  Now	  this	  is	  a	  social	  evolutionary	  hypothesis,	  there	  is	  no	  ‘whig	  interpretation	  of	  history’	  here	  (Butterfield	  1978).	  	  My	  claim	  is	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not	  that	  ‘liberty	  will	  out’	  in	  its	  long	  march	  through	  history,	  but	  rather	  that	  those	  systems	  that	  can	  deliver	  this	  reinforcing	  circuit	  of	  power-­‐to	  and	  power-­‐over	  will	  have	  an	  advantage,	  and	  will	  tend	  to	  displace	  those	  that	  don’t.	  	  The	  often-­‐remarked	  trend	  toward	  democracy	  in	  our	  times	  (Dahl	  2000,	  Dunn	  2006)	  is	  not	  a	  triumph	  of	  virtue	  or	  reason,	  but	  an	  outcome	  of	  the	  evolutionary	  logic	  of	  power	  to/over.	  	  We	  may	  indeed	  prefer	  to	  live	  in	  some	  variant	  of	  liberal	  society,	  but	  such	  values	  are	  not	  in	  any	  simple	  sense	  the	  causes	  of	  the	  rise	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  society—to	  think	  so	  would	  be	  hubris.	  	  There	  is	  no	  guarantee	  from	  either	  evolution	  or	  history	  that	  this	  sociopolitical	  form	  of	  society	  will	  maintain	  its	  advantage	  in	  the	  future.	  	  As	  the	  context	  and	  environment	  changes,	  so	  will	  the	  determinants	  of	  advantage.	  
Having	  also	  argued	  above	  that	  macro-­‐scale	  developments	  in	  the	  evolutions	  of	  societies	  are	  in	  fact	  aggregate	  effects	  of	  smaller	  scale	  selection	  processes	  among	  social	  forms,	  let	  me	  briefly	  elaborate	  one	  such	  example	  of	  a	  social	  form	  that	  has	  been	  in	  key	  ingredient	  in	  this	  larger	  rise	  of	  the	  liberal	  form	  of	  society.	  	  I	  focus	  on	  ‘competition’	  both	  as	  an	  idea,	  and	  as	  a	  highly	  ritualized	  institutionix.	  	  By	  competition	  in	  this	  context	  I	  do	  not	  mean	  the	  general	  condition	  of	  struggle	  over	  limited	  goods	  and	  resources,	  found	  both	  in	  the	  natural	  world	  of	  biological	  evolution,	  and	  throughout	  human	  history.	  	  More	  specifically,	  I	  mean	  the	  deliberate	  and	  artificial	  organisation	  of	  activity	  in	  highly	  formalized	  ways	  so	  as	  to	  bring	  actors	  into	  a	  contest	  over	  limited	  goods,	  both	  material	  and	  symbolic,	  and	  achieve	  an	  outcome	  of	  the	  allocation	  of	  those	  goods.	  	  This	  is	  a	  pervasive	  form	  in	  liberal	  societies.	  	  The	  market	  is	  ambiguously	  understood	  as	  both	  a	  natural	  manifestation	  and	  a	  legally	  constituted	  arena	  of	  regulated	  competition	  in	  which	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the	  market,	  as	  a	  mechanism	  of	  justice,	  allocates	  rewards	  to	  the	  successful.	  	  The	  modern	  democratic	  political	  system,	  only	  dimly	  foreseen	  in	  eighteenth	  century,	  has	  become	  stabilised	  and	  institutionalised	  through	  the	  establishments	  of	  competitive	  party	  systems	  and	  routinised	  election	  procedures	  that	  allocate	  access	  to	  governmental	  power.	  	  	  Popular	  culture,	  through	  sports	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  entertainment,	  has	  elaborated	  competition	  into	  a	  highly	  stylised	  form	  of	  expression,	  at	  once	  diverting	  spectacle	  and	  dramatic	  distillation	  of	  the	  wider	  society.	  	  Lest	  we	  regard	  ourselves	  as	  ‘social	  scientists’	  as	  aloof	  from	  the	  grubby	  world	  of	  competition,	  we	  should	  remember	  the	  competitive	  workings	  of	  funding	  calls	  and	  promotion	  rounds	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  our	  intellectual	  activity	  is	  largely	  a	  formalised	  competition	  among	  ideas	  (cf.	  Hull	  1988).	  	  
On	  the	  one	  hand	  competition	  permeates	  social	  life	  in	  liberal	  society	  as	  an	  idea	  and	  ideal,	  as	  a	  broad	  governing	  principle.	  	  Even	  those	  of	  us	  who	  have	  reservations	  about	  too	  much	  economic	  competition	  ‘red	  in	  tooth	  and	  claw’,	  would	  probably	  prefer	  more	  robust	  competition	  amongst	  political	  views	  in	  public	  discourse,	  and	  would	  want	  to	  maintain	  real	  and	  vibrant	  competition	  in	  the	  democratic	  arena.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  this	  idea	  beds	  down	  as	  ritual.	  	  We	  don’t	  have	  to	  think	  it	  all	  the	  time	  because	  we	  are,	  by	  routine,	  doing	  it	  so	  much	  of	  the	  time.	  	  Here	  I	  intend	  to	  invoke	  the	  anthropological	  tradition	  of	  theorising	  about	  ritual,	  and	  to	  suggest	  that	  competition	  in	  its	  more	  stylised	  forms	  exhibits	  many	  of	  the	  classic	  features	  of	  ritual:	  (1)	  to	  be	  legitimate	  certain	  rules	  and	  procedures	  must	  be	  observed	  and	  followed;	  (2)	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  ritual	  alters	  the	  status	  of	  the	  key	  participants,	  i.e.	  transforms	  them	  into	  ‘winners’	  and	  ‘losers’;	  (3)	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the	  competitive	  ritual	  is	  often	  performed	  for	  a	  wider	  audience,	  in	  the	  process	  dramatizing	  and	  validating	  core	  values	  of	  the	  society	  (Hearn	  2014).	  	  
More	  than	  this,	  competition	  is	  central	  to	  the	  legitimation	  of	  liberal	  society	  (Hearn	  2011).	  	  Such	  societies	  evince	  a	  deep	  ambivalence	  about	  power,	  maximizing	  the	  desire	  for	  individual	  liberty	  and	  autonomy,	  and	  being	  suspicious	  of	  all	  claims	  to	  rule	  from	  above.	  	  But	  as	  I	  have	  suggested,	  they	  are	  in	  fact	  premised	  on	  the	  complex	  interdependence	  of	  increased	  powers	  to	  and	  over,	  at	  all	  levels.	  	  Ritualised	  competition	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  allocate	  social	  goods,	  while	  often	  appearing	  to	  do	  this	  in	  a	  ‘natural’	  way	  without	  deferring	  to	  some	  arbitrary	  power.	  	  Thus	  it	  can	  legitimise	  outcomes	  and	  allocations	  of	  power,	  in	  the	  act,	  while	  appearing	  to	  stand	  outside	  the	  power	  hierarchies	  of	  formal	  authority.	  	  It	  is	  ideally	  suited	  to	  the	  legitmation	  of	  power	  in	  a	  form	  of	  society	  that	  distrusts	  power	  (as	  much	  as	  it	  inevitably	  needs	  it).	  	  	  
Finally,	  I	  come	  back	  to	  the	  evolutionary	  argument.	  	  The	  social	  form	  of	  competition	  has	  become	  increasingly	  ramified	  and	  ritualised	  in	  liberal	  forms	  of	  society	  since	  the	  eighteenth	  century	  precisely	  because	  it	  is	  selected	  for,	  because	  it	  serves	  the	  functional	  needs	  of	  that	  kind	  of	  society	  for	  a	  mechanism	  that	  legitimately	  allocates	  goods	  while	  also	  sustaining	  the	  creative	  dynamism	  of	  the	  society,	  and	  not	  appearing	  to	  endorse	  any	  power	  merely	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  tradition.	  	  What	  emerges	  in	  this	  period	  is	  what	  I	  call	  ‘reflexive	  competition’,	  that	  is,	  competition	  not	  simply	  as	  an	  observable	  fact	  or	  description	  of	  social	  interaction,	  but	  as	  an	  explicitly	  formulated	  idea	  that	  can	  be,	  and	  is,	  harnessed	  and	  put	  to	  use.	  Competition	  as	  a	  value	  and	  strategy.	  	  The	  two	  great	  intellectual	  	  moments	  in	  the	  formulation	  of	  this	  new,	  reflexive	  concept	  of	  competition	  were	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Adam	  Smith’s	  treatment	  of	  the	  emerging	  market	  economy,	  and	  Charles	  Darwin’s	  theory	  of	  evolution.	  	  Accordingly	  both	  these	  ideas	  have	  fed	  social	  theorisations	  and	  popular	  discourses	  far	  beyond	  their	  original	  domains	  of	  application	  in	  economics	  and	  biological	  evolution,	  precisely	  because	  they	  have	  proven	  so	  powerful,	  and,	  in	  a	  word,	  applicable.	  
Conclusion	  
I	  have	  argued	  that	  human	  social	  evolution	  has	  involved	  a	  dialectical	  increase	  in	  our	  powers	  –to	  and	  –over.	  	  I	  have	  also	  suggested	  that	  contemporary	  liberal	  society	  needs	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  particularly	  successful	  ‘strategy’	  for	  maximizing	  this	  dialectic.	  	  But	  I	  would	  conclude	  by	  emphasising	  that	  the	  language	  of	  human	  emancipation	  and	  natural	  liberty	  that	  liberal	  societies	  have	  inherited	  from	  the	  Enlightenment	  has	  also	  disabled	  us	  for	  the	  analyisis	  of	  the	  form	  of	  society	  we	  live	  in.	  	  We	  tend	  to	  conceptualise	  power	  in	  negative	  terms	  as	  tyrannical	  or	  despotic	  rule,	  because	  our	  characteristic	  ideas	  about	  power	  were	  formulated	  as	  parts	  of	  critiques	  of	  older	  systems	  of	  aristocratic	  rule	  that	  were	  increasingly	  seen	  as	  illegitimate.	  	  When	  we	  want	  to	  talk	  and	  theorise	  about	  how	  power	  works	  in	  the	  liberal	  societies	  we	  find	  ourselves	  in,	  there	  is	  a	  predisposition	  to	  think	  of	  power	  as	  a	  cryptic	  and	  thus	  illegitimate	  form	  of	  domination.	  	  Our	  class	  habitus	  which	  is	  too	  naturalised	  for	  us	  to	  fully	  perceive	  keeps	  us	  in	  our	  places	  (Bourdieu	  1990).	  	  The	  production	  and	  projection	  of	  knowledge	  inevitably	  molds	  our	  subjectivities	  making	  us	  believe	  that	  which	  we	  might	  otherwise	  question	  (Foucault	  2000:	  326-­‐48).	  	  The	  deepest,	  ‘third	  dimension’	  of	  power	  shapes	  our	  very	  wants	  and	  preferences	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  conducive	  to	  given	  regimes	  of	  power	  (Lukes	  1974).	  	  I	  am	  not	  entirely	  rejecting	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these	  formulations	  as	  more	  subtle	  ways	  of	  understanding	  the	  workings	  of	  ideology.	  	  But	  I	  am	  questioning	  their	  overall	  adequacy,	  and	  suggesting	  that	  even	  if	  offered	  by	  the	  theorists	  in	  question	  as	  one	  part	  of	  the	  power	  puzzle,	  they	  tend	  to	  get	  picked	  up	  and	  emphasised	  more	  generally	  precisely	  because	  they	  reinforce	  an	  attitude	  of	  suspicion	  towards	  power	  that	  we	  are	  most	  comfortable	  with.	  	  My	  broader	  aim	  in	  this	  article	  is	  to	  work	  toward	  a	  less	  suspicious	  and	  more	  pragmatic	  attitude	  towards	  power	  in	  liberal	  society,	  one	  that	  recognizes	  it	  as	  an	  outcome	  of	  a	  long	  train	  of	  social	  evolution,	  in	  which	  power	  is	  never	  overcome,	  but	  only	  deepened,	  increased,	  and	  ramified.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  i	  A	  couple	  of	  general	  indications	  of	  this:	  (1)	  The	  tradition	  of	  theorizing	  elite	  power	  that	  runs	  from	  Pareto,	  Mosca	  and	  Michels	  up	  to	  figures	  such	  as	  G.	  William	  Domhoff	  	  (1983)	  is	  often	  marginalized	  in	  the	  power	  theory	  literature.	  	  I	  think	  the	  blunt	  acceptance	  that	  there	  are	  such	  things	  as	  elites	  often	  makes	  us	  uneasy.	  	  (2)	  The	  work	  of	  Foucault	  (2000)	  often	  vaguely	  describes	  power	  as	  a	  pervasive,	  un-­‐centred	  and	  relational,	  resisting	  grappling	  with	  its	  hierarchical	  patterns,	  but	  is	  accompanied	  by	  a	  notion	  of	  ‘local	  knowledges’	  struggling	  to	  break	  free	  of	  ‘dominant	  discourses’	  in	  ways	  that	  sentimentally	  echo	  Enlightenment	  ideas	  of	  emancipation.	  
ii	  From	  here	  on	  I	  will	  use	  the	  hyphen	  to	  distinguish	  these	  two	  sub-­‐concepts,	  and	  the	  oblique	  to	  highlight	  when	  I	  want	  to	  indicate	  both	  senses	  in	  tandem.	  	  I	  want	  to	  avoid	  a	  proliferation	  of	  inverted	  commas.	  
iii	  Even	  personality	  types,	  in	  the	  Weberian	  sense	  of	  Menschentum	  might	  be	  considered	  social	  forms	  in	  this	  sense	  (see	  Darmon	  2011).	  
iv	  Progress	  however,	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  a	  trend,	  or	  directionality	  (see	  Blute	  2010:	  ch	  8).	  Here	  biological	  evolutionary	  theory	  is	  more	  ambivalent,	  and	  so	  must	  social	  evolutionary	  theory	  be.	  	  All	  evidence	  points	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  life	  began	  in	  simple	  environmentally	  constrained	  forms,	  and	  gradually	  increased	  in	  complexity	  and	  ability	  to	  spread	  across	  diverse	  environments.	  	  This	  suggests	  a	  macro-­‐level	  directionality	  to	  biological	  evolution.	  	  But	  once	  the	  initial	  colonization	  of	  the	  Earth	  by	  life	  had	  happened,	  the	  number	  of	  species	  has	  risen	  and	  fallen	  without	  a	  clear	  trend	  (although	  subject	  to	  other	  causal	  processes,	  e.g.	  those	  leading	  to	  mass	  extinctions).	  	  Similarly,	  complexity	  can	  be	  difficult	  to	  define,	  but	  the	  morphological-­‐functional	  complexity	  of	  species	  is	  often	  known	  to	  reduce	  depending	  on	  conditions	  (e.g.	  eyes	  ‘atrophy’	  in	  lightless	  cave	  environments).	  	  Within	  particular	  species	  and	  sets	  of	  species,	  sometimes	  particular	  sets	  of	  environmental	  conditions	  tend	  to	  promote	  morphological	  changes	  in	  one	  direction	  over	  a	  period	  of	  time	  (e.g.	  increase	  in	  body	  size),	  but	  this	  kind	  of	  directionality	  is	  specific	  to	  the	  species-­‐environment	  relationships	  in	  question,	  not	  a	  general	  evolutionary	  rule.	  	  Very	  often	  variations	  within	  a	  given	  species	  accumulate	  over	  time	  randomly,	  without	  any	  clear	  trend.	  	  The	  example	  of	  biological	  evolution	  suggests	  caution	  is	  needed	  when	  proposing	  overall	  trends	  for	  social	  evolution.	  	  Nonetheless,	  there	  do	  appear	  to	  be	  some	  large	  if	  non-­‐
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  linear	  trends	  in	  human	  history:	  the	  increasing	  numbers	  of	  the	  global	  population;	  the	  expansion	  into	  more	  diverse	  environments;	  the	  growth	  in	  scale	  of	  social	  organization	  and	  political	  cephalisation;	  the	  concentration	  of	  people	  in	  ever	  larger	  cities;	  the	  expansion	  and	  acceleration	  of	  communicative	  capacities;	  the	  increased	  harnessing	  and	  exploitation	  of	  extra-­‐somatic	  energy	  sources.	  	  As	  with	  directional	  change	  within	  species,	  there	  is	  a	  question	  at	  least	  posed	  here	  about	  whether	  certain	  conditions	  are	  driving	  these	  trends.	  
v	  Blute	  (2010:	  ch	  6)	  takes	  a	  pragmatic	  view	  of	  the	  meme	  concept:	  ‘memes	  if	  useful—but	  not	  necessarily	  memes’	  (ibid.:20).	  	  	  Hodgson	  and	  Knudsen	  (2010:	  132-­‐36),	  are	  much	  more	  critical,	  arguing	  that	  it	  relies	  on	  imprecise	  notions	  of	  ‘information’	  and	  ‘ideas’.	  	  
vi	  Whether	  this	  is	  a	  sufficient	  definition	  of	  culture	  is	  debatable	  (see	  Hearn	  2011:	  203).	  
vii	  For	  a	  somewhat	  similar	  critical	  response	  to	  Randall	  Collins’s	  rejection	  of	  evolutionism,	  see	  Sanderson’s	  comments	  in	  Collins	  (2009:	  269-­‐272).	  
viii	  For	  instance,	  the	  burning	  and	  destruction	  of	  temples	  and	  elite	  residences	  in	  Teotihuacan	  in	  the	  Valley	  of	  Mexico	  around	  650	  AD,	  followed	  by	  the	  dispersion	  of	  much	  of	  the	  population	  back	  into	  rural	  areas	  (Cowgill	  1997:	  156-­‐57).	  
ix	  Competition	  is	  the	  theme	  of	  my	  current	  mid-­‐career	  fellowship	  funded	  by	  the	  
Independent	  Social	  Research	  Foundation,	  entitled	  ‘The	  Transformation	  of	  Competition:	  A	  Study	  in	  the	  Formation	  of	  Modernity	  and	  Liberal	  Societies’	  (see	  Hearn	  2012:	  147-­‐50).	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